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ABSTRACT
Donations to charity-based crowdfunding environments have been
on the rise in the last few years. Unsurprisingly, deception and
fraud in such platforms have also increased, but have not been thor-
oughly studied to understand what characteristics can expose such
behavior and allow its automatic detection and blocking. Indeed,
crowdfunding platforms are the only ones typically performing
oversight for the campaigns launched in each service. However,
they are not properly incentivized to combat fraud among users and
the campaigns they launch: on the one hand, a platform’s revenue
is directly proportional to the number of transactions performed
(since the platform charges a fixed amount per donation); on the
other hand, if a platform is transparent with respect to how much
fraud it has, it may discourage potential donors from participating.
In this paper, we take the first step in studying fraud in crowd-
funding campaigns. We analyze data collected from different crowd-
funding platforms, and annotate 700 campaigns as fraud or not.
We compute various textual and image-based features and study
their distributions and how they associate with campaign fraud.
Using these attributes, we build machine learning classifiers, and
show that it is possible to automatically classify such fraudulent
behavior with up to 90.14% accuracy and 96.01% AUC, only using
features available from the campaign’s description at the moment
of publication (i.e., with no user or money activity), making our
method applicable for real-time operation on a user browser.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Economics of security and privacy; •
Computing methodologies→ Supervised learning by classifica-
tion.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Crowdfunding has become a standard means to financially support
individuals’ needs or ideas, typically through an online campaign
appealing to contributions from the community. What started off as
a grassroots movement is now a flourishing industry. In fact, from
$597M raised worldwide in 2014, to $17.2B, in North America alone,
in 2017, this industry will continue to grow globally [34]. Over
the last decade, the emergence and consolidation of crowdfunding
platforms (CFPs) have narrowed the field to a handful of platforms.
Top contenders, such as Kickstarter, FundingCircle, and GoFundMe,
have specialized into one of three categories: investment-based
platforms where donors become angel investors in a new enter-
prise; reward-based platforms where the backers provide loans
with the condition of interest upon repayment; and donation-based
platforms where campaigns are an appeal to charity [2].
CFPs and their increasing popularity and fundraising ability
for many causes (even recently for coronavirus-related costs [30])
inevitably attract malicious actors who take advantage of unsus-
pecting users (e.g., [14, 27, 36, 37]). Immediate access to trusting
investors and their funds make these platforms particularly attrac-
tive to malicious activity. Some platforms allow fund disbursements
to happen immediately following a donation, while others require
scheduled intervals (e.g., weekly), or reaching donation goals.
Furthermore, there is a striking lack of regulation in this space [17].
This void leaves a grey area where crimes are hard to define and dif-
ficult to prosecute. The emergence of few highly publicized cases of
fraud in crowdfunding campaigns further undermines general pub-
lic confidence in this trust-based enterprise. Nevertheless, evidence
of campaign and fund misuse is scant. According to GoFundMe, one
of the most prominent CFPs, fraudulent campaigns make up less
than 0.1% of all campaigns posted on the site [13]. But even at this
“low” rate of fraud, which has not be substantiated with transparent
reports by GoFundMe or other CFPs, in a billion dollar industry,
it can amount to tens of millions in defrauded funds every year.
Given CFPs’ major source of revenue are these campaigns, through
commissions on new campaigns and on every donation, CFPs are
not properly incentivized to detect and stop fraud. Therefore, the
lack of tools quantifying this problem is not surprising, effectively
preventing the protection of unsuspected contributors.
In this study, we aim to provide such tools to help combat fraud
in donation-based CFPs. We analyze campaigns in North Amer-
ica created to cover medical expenses, a primary reason for these
types of appeals (one in three crowdfunding campaigns [24]). The
urgency and strong emotional content of health-related financial
constraints easily attract donor attention and donations. We are
interested in quantifying the prevalence of fraudulent behavior in
these campaigns, requiring us to classify campaigns as fraud or not.
Our goal is to create a machine learning (ML) classifier to distin-
guish between campaigns that are fraudulent or not, at the moment
of their creation, i.e., using only features extracted from campaigns
newly published. To accomplish our task, we collect and annotate
over 700 campaigns from all major CFPs (GoFundMe, MightyCause,
Fundly, Fundrazr, and Indiegogo) and derive deception cues from
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both the text and the images provided in each campaign. Overall,
we find that fraud is a small percentage of the crowdfunding ecosys-
tem, but an insidious problem. It corrodes the trust ecosystem on
which these platforms operate on, endangering the support that
thousands of people receive year on year. Our results show that
using an ensemble ML classifier that combines both textual and
visual cues, we can achieve a Precision of 91.14%, Recall 90.77%
and AUC 96.01%, i.e., approximately 41% improvement over the
deception detection abilities of people within the same culture [5].
This work is also the first to incorporate text and images in the anal-
ysis of fraud, and we rely on features available immediately after a
campaign goes live. This is a significant step in building a system
that is preemptive (e.g., a browser plugin) as opposed to reactive.
We believe our method could help build trust in this ecosystem,
by allowing potential donors to vet campaigns before contributing.
Similarly, CFPs could use it to prompt vetting and request additional
information from a potentially fraudulent campaign creators before
campaigns are made public.
Our contributions with the present study are as follows:
• We collect a dataset of over 700 crowdfunding campaigns
on different health-related topics, including medical, emer-
gency appeals, and memorials, and annotate them for being
fraudulent or not.
• Through the use of NLP techniques, we extract language
cues, including emotions and complexity of language, and
study their association with fraudulent campaigns.
• Using convolutional neural networks, we extract character-
istics of the images posted with each campaign, including
emotions and content displayed, and associate them with
fraudulent campaigns.
• Using the above features (text and image-based), we train
supervised classification techniques to perform automatic
detection of fraudulent campaigns, and discuss our results.
• We make the collected and annotated dataset available for
other researchers to further investigate this problem on CFPs.
2 RELATEDWORK
Previous work on financial fraud highlights this task’s complexity.
Financial information has typically been used to predict the likeli-
hood of a given transaction being fraudulent. Primarily, past works
build behavioral profiles for each user to compute the likelihood
of a new transaction being legitimate [1, 3, 6, 10, 26, 31, 33]. Novel
models in finance technology have opened new areas of research
in this space.
Some works focus on detecting deception online. Luca and Zer-
vas [23] take a set of reviews identified as fraud or not fraud by the
platform Yelp and explore the determinants of fraudulent behav-
ior. The authors explore how restaurants’ engagement in positive
and/or negative review fraud (i.e., fake reviews) interacts with rep-
utation and competition, over time. We use insights from these
fraudulent reviews to shape our understanding of fraudulent de-
ceptive behavior in CFP campaigns.
In their work on Peer-to-Peer lending, Xu et al. [39] explore
trust relationships between borrowers and lenders. Funds raised
can be used for private affairs (i.e., there are no business plans and
no milestones to rely on for validation), just like crowdfunding
campaigns. However, in their model, the money is meant to be
restituted and the network members build up their reputation over
time. They find that soft descriptions of the borrower, e.g., age,
gender, race, and appearance, are good predictors of whether a loan
will be repaid in time. Conversely, the physical appearance (gender,
race, and attractiveness) of the campaign’s creator as understood
from their profile picture can be used to predict the trustworthiness
and, by extension, the success of a campaign [11, 22, 29]. Again,
such features help us better understand trust relationships between
funders and requesters.
Similarly to Peer-to-Peer lending, crowdfunding is an online
financial tool in the hands of millions. Both are paradigms that de-
pend on participant trust, and fraud against them “causes emotional
and financial harm to lenders (donors) and great damage to sites
(platforms) destroying their reputation" [39]. The study of fraud in
crowdfunding has been tied to the success of the campaign [38],
or to entrepreneurial endeavors. In fact, Wessel et al. [38] looked
at social capital as a means to influence consumer decision mak-
ing. They take 591 campaigns that have been flagged for having
fake Facebook likes and find that fake social capital has an overall
negative impact on the number of backers of a campaign.
Siering et al. [32] looked at the problem of deception in crowd-
funding campaigns, focusing on investment-based donations, where
there is an expectation of a reward and a defined business plan. Im-
portantly, these are business interactions, fundamentally different
from the altruistic behavior implied in our campaigns. Based on
linguistic text cues, their model presented in [32] achieves 75% ac-
curacy. We build on textual features and combine them with image
features, leading our model to achieve 86% accuracy.
Finally, and most similar to our work, Cumming et al. [9] look
at entrepreneurial campaigns (i.e., commercial campaigns with
pledges and rewards) and try to understand the difference between
campaigns labeled as detected fraud, suspected fraud, and not fraud.
Using theories from economics and behavioral sciences they iden-
tify four possible markers: characteristics and background of the
campaign creator (i.e., use of names and further participation in
the community), a campaigns’ affinity to social media, funding and
reward structure in the campaign (i.e., the duration of the cam-
paign), and finally, details in the campaign description (i.e., clarity
of language and veracity). They test their markers in a dataset of
207 fraud cases from two major crowdfunding portals (Kickstarter
and Indiegogo) and find that fraudulent campaigns can be described
as having longer periods of collection, no Facebook page associated
to it, and campaign creators with comparatively less time in the
crowdfunding community. Even though relevant to our work, there
are several primary differences with Cumming et al. [9]: 1) the type
and incentive behind the campaigns (entrepreneurial vs. charitable
donations for health problems), 2) when the funds are available (the
full amount must be raised vs. immediately available), 3) the tone
and the content of the text in the campaigns. Indeed, while we do
borrow their insights on the relationship between fraud and the
simplicity of text, the problem we are addressing is different.
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Table 1: Data fields available across crowdfunding sites. These fields were available during the annotation process. The auto-
mated ML analysis focuses on the campaign description, including text and image content. Note that many fields are variable
(e.g., money raised, donors, etc.) and are not available to the ML process for use when the campaign is first published.
Feature Description
Creation Date Timestamp of the public release date.
Campaign Duration For time-limited campaigns, the difference between release and close date. Otherwise, it reflects the time elapsed
between release and the time of scrapping.
Campaign Status Reflects whether the campaign is open for donations or not (boolean).
Title Title of the campaign.
Created by Campaigns may be a direct appeal or an appeal made on behalf of another. This field contains a reference to the
owner of the campaign who might be different from the beneficiary.
Description A narrative of the cause for which the campaign is launched (and updates to the story).
Category The general classification of the campaign (e.g., Memorial, Health, Emergencies, etc.).
Fundraising Goal The total amount of money the creator hopes to raise.
Money Raised The money that has been raised by the campaign to date.
Number of Donors The number of individual contributors to the cause.
Donation Amount The individual amounts from each of the contributions.
Social Media The number of likes or shares that the campaign has received over social media.
Geo-Tag The location from which the campaign was launched.
3 CROWDFUNDING CAMPAIGN DATA
COLLECTION AND ANNOTATION
3.1 Background on CFPs
Crowdfunding sites are designed to help people connect funding
requests with benefactors. While each CFP is different, they all pro-
vide a search engine to find specific campaigns and a classification
system that allows visitors to find campaigns that may be relevant
to their interests. In this paper, we looked at campaigns from the
top five crowdfunding platforms online: Indiegogo, GoFundMe,
MightyCause, Fundrazr, and Fundly. The information displayed per
campaign varies depending on the platform and on the creator of
the campaign. Table 1 summarizes the fields and descriptions that
are common across all sites.
Depending on the type of campaign and hosting platform, funds
raised are delivered either to the campaign creator or its benefi-
ciary. Typically, entrepreneurial campaigns require a goal to be met
before funds are released (not reaching a funding goal results in
contributions being returned to investors), whereas in charitable
projects, there is no limit as to how soon or often any funds are
withdrawn from the campaign. In terms of revenue, gofundme.com,
the most prominent CFP, states that they charge a percentage of
the transaction as fees, plus a fixed amount per donation [12].
Finally, CFPs are aware of the risk of fraud and some offer a guar-
antee: any member that made a donation to a fraudulent campaign
is entitled to a refund by the CFP. The reimbursement, however,
must be requested by the donor after an internal investigation re-
veals the campaign to be fraudulent. When a campaign is reported
as suspicious, the CFP will send a request for information to the
creator of the campaign. Following the initial report, continued
suspicious behavior might result in a campaign being deactivated,
or altogether removed. A deactivated campaign will show the title,
primary image and total funds raised. A removed campaign will
result in a redirect to the CFPs main website. A missing or deacti-
vated campaign, however, is not always an indication of fraud. For
example, a campaign created to raise funds outside a CFP’s “dona-
tion cover area” results in the campaign being removed from the
platform. Alternatively, campaign creators might close a campaign
if the fundraising goal has been met, or an event has passed.
3.2 Defining Fraud
Fraud is generally defined as a misrepresentation of an existing fact,
made from one person to another, with knowledge of its falsity and
for the purpose of inducing the other to act [35]. One requirement
of fraud is therefore deception, as it requires the perpetrator to con-
vince the victim that their (false) statement is true. It also results in
damages to the victim and is, most importantly, a criminal offense1.
First, we must recognize that fraud is an umbrella term used to
define a range of behaviors including embezzlement where (legiti-
matelly acquired) funds are missappropriated; opportunist fraud
where a real story draws criminals to fabricate association to the
people/event; or complete fiction in both events and associations,
among others. In this work we are attempting to automate the
process of recognizing cues available at the time of publication of
a crowdfunding campaign where the creator of the campaign is
aware of the falsehood of the claims in the campaign. We refer to
these campaigns as fake. As an example, opportunist campaigns are
fake: the creator of the campaign has limited information which
can be reflected in his writing style and choice of picture2.
In the results we present, our priority is to minimize the number
of false positives (i.e., real campaigns mislabeled as fraud). However,
it is not possible to completely eliminate type II errors (i.e., fraud
campaigns that were misclassified as real). Cases like embezzlement
1To date, crowdfunding fraud cases have been prosecuted as theft by swindle, larceny,
wire fraud, child endangerement, failure to make required distribution of funds, mail
fraud, and felony grand theft among others
2In contrast, fraud by emblezzement is not-fake
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where the people, events, and description are real and with the
appropriate level of detail but, where the funds were never delivered
to the rightful recipient cannot be identified before the decision
to commit a crime has been carried out. Therefore, the results we
present should be understood as a lower bound of the number
of cases to be expected in the wild. This work, however, is an
improvement upon the current state of the art in detection of these
types of campaigns where the determination of fraud is delegated
to the CFPs, and the individual contributors are left on their own
devices and judgement to decide if a campaign is fraudulent or not.
3.3 Datasets
We have two main sources of data: a set of campaigns that have
been confirmed3 as fraud and collected from GoFraudMe [14] (we
will refer to these as set A), and two sets of manually annotated
campaigns collected from different CFPs (sets B and C).
3.3.1 Labeled data from GoFraudMe.com (set A). The goal of this
website, maintained by an investigative journalist, is to expose
fraudulent cases in the GoFundMe platform. The site serves the dual
purpose of holding the CFP accountable for fraudulent campaigns
and presenting, preserving, and publicizing the evidence that led to
the characterization of fraud. The site holds 192 confirmed cases of
fraud that were shared with us by the website curator. The process
that leads to the inclusion of a campaign in the website varies
greatly, but each is accompanied by a narrative that presents the
inconsistencies that led to the declaration of fraud. Some campaigns
have the guarantee of a guilty verdict following legal criminal
proceedings, whereas others have been denounced by beneficiaries
and supported by their community. Some of the cases presented,
typically those that follow from events reported in various news
platforms, give rise to several fraudulent campaigns. For some cases,
there is an archived version of the campaign that was used to collect
money with a link to the rightful beneficiary. For others, there is a
timeline following the investigation, that led to criminal charges
(and subsequent conviction if it is available).
3.3.2 Annotated Data (sets B & C). In addition to the labeled cam-
paigns collected from set A, we created two manually annotated
datasets. Set B: 191 campaigns from the Medical category in Go-
FundMe.com. Set C: 350 campaigns from different CFPs that were
directly related to organ transplants. Sets B and C were manually
annotated following the methodology described in the Section 3.4.
Set C is a random sample of 350 campaigns related to organ trans-
plants collected in January 2019 from the top 5 CFPs: Indiegogo,
GoFundMe, MightyCause, Fundrazr, and Fundly. Both B and C sets
were collected through automated crawlers written in python. From
each campaign, we collected the features in Table 1 as well as all
comments, pictures, and individual donations. Each campaign was
visited in the order presented by the CFP’s search engine. While
some CFPs provided APIs to connect with their database, the data
fields were collected, for the most part, through the corresponding
elements in HTML.
Table 2: Breakdown of the labels for the 733 annotated cam-
paigns. All campaigns had a textual description and many
had several images as part of their appeal.
Score Label Text Images
0 invalid 93 117
1 fraud 141 138
2 probably fraud 26 71
3 unknown 105 123
4 probably not-fraud 78 141
5 not-fraud 290 517
3.4 Campaign Annotation
Combined, sets A, B and C make up the ground truth in the study.
Sets A and B are inversely balanced in the sense that one provides
mostly examples of fraud and the other mostly not-fraud4. Set C
was created as a means to augment the number of campaigns in
the study. All campaigns were manually annotated using the scale
proposed in Table 2, where (1) indicates certainty of fraud and
(5) certainty of not-fraud. During manual annotation, two expert
annotators developed guidelines to determine the label of each
campaign. The considerations in the guidelines included:
• A personal (offline) knowledge of the circumstances that led
to the appeal as evidenced in the support messages posted to
the campaign. Knowledge is reflected (but not limited to) in
having met the beneficiary (or having first hand knowledge
of the circumstances), participating in offline fundraising
activities, or familial relationships between donors.
• A sense of closure to each campaign, particularly those that
have been open for donations for several years.
• Coherency between the description, support documents, pic-
tures, fundraising goal, donors, and level of detail.
• Participation of the creator in other campaigns.
• Reverse search of pictures and text diplayed in the campaign
leading to unrelated results in the web.
• Evidence of contradictory information.
• Overwhelming lack of engagement of campaign donors.
The label of fraud assigned by the annotators was independent
of the features engineered for automated detection. The annotators
relied on semantic interpretation. The features used in the models
are stylistic markers of the textual description and the images in
the campaign. To this extent, we are reasonably certain that while
the label of fraud might be incomplete (i.e., it will not capture all
categories of fraud), it is correct. Ultimately, we considered 704
campaigns in the study, with some campaigns removed from the
dataset because the content was no longer accessible, the text was
in multiple languages, or there were too few characters to compute
any of the text-based features.
3Confirmed means either a conviction following a criminal indictment or a condemna-
tion from the victims (more in Section 3.3.1).
4From our findings, the prevalence of fraud in a random sample of medical campaigns
is approximately 10%, in contrast to the 0.1% claimed by CFPs. Therefore most of the
campaigns we looked at in Set B were not-fraud.
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(a) Text (b) Images
Figure 1: Comparing the emotions displayed in the text and image of the campaign.
Inter-annotator reliability (or consistency) refers to the validity
of the variable being measured [25]. In this project, we had a struc-
tured subjective task, where we iteratively refined and applied a set
of guidelines that define fraud to each of the campaigns reviewed.
At the end of the first iteration, annotators reconciled the labels
and revised the guidelines. At the end of the second round of an-
notations, and for campaigns with contradictory labels, the final
decision was agreed by discussion and consensus between anno-
tators. We measured the consistency across annotators for each
iteration using Cohen’s Kappa (κ) [8]. We applied the interpretation
scale proposed by Landis and Koch [21], where values between 0.6
and 0.8 are considered to reflect a substantial agreement between
annotators. At the end of the first iteration, κ was found to be 0.451,
reflecting only moderate agreement between annotators. After re-
vising the guidelines, at the end of the second round of annotations,
κ = 0.675. Ultimately, the values used as labels for classification
were considered of binary form, i.e., 1 for fraud and 0 for not-fraud,
that reflect consensus across annotators (i.e., a dataset with κ = 1).
4 CAMPAIGN FRAUD: TEXTUAL CUES
The description of the campaign is the best line of communication
between the campaign creator or beneficiary and any potential
donors. Therefore, it is the first place where a malicious actor might
leave traces of deception. In this section, we present five different
areas where automated analysis might find quantitative evidence
of deception. We also present some preliminary analysis of the
variable categories with respect to our classification variable: fraud.
4.1 Feature Extraction
4.1.1 Sentiment Analysis. We extract the sentiment and tone ex-
pressed in the text for further analysis using IBM services [4]. The
sentiment is computed as a probability across five basic emotions:
sadness, joy, fear, disgust, and anger. Complementary to emotions,
the text’s tone can also express a campaign’s intent. We analyze
confidence scores for seven possible tones: frustration, satisfaction,
excitement, politeness, impoliteness, sadness, and sympathy.
4.1.2 Complexity and Language Choice. The need for appeal to a
more general population can lead fake campaign creators to adapt
(or carefully select) the language used. Simpler language and shorter
sentences can appeal to the emotions of the reader and, therefore, be
more successful. To check the language complexity of the document
and word choice, we look at a series of readability scores (e.g.,
automated readability index, Dale-Chall Formula, etc.) and language
features (e.g., function words, personal pronouns, average syllables
per word, total number of characters, etc.) [9, 38].
4.1.3 Named-Entity Recognition. Named-Entity recognition is the
process of identifying named entities (e.g. proper nouns, numeric
entities, currencies) in unstructured text and assigning them to a
finite set of categories. In this project, we relied on spaCy [16] a
tool released for Python which identifies 18 types of entities in text.
SpaCy models are based on convolutional neural networks built
with pre-trained vectors which give an accuracy of 86.42%.
4.1.4 Form of the text. The next group of features we considered
was the visual structure of the text. For the entire textual dataset
we captured the form of each word: whether the letters were all
lower-case, all upper-case, the number of emojis on the text, the
number of words with exclamation mark, the words with apostro-
phes, and many others. We generated a vector with 255 descriptors
and evaluated the text in each campaign against the features.
4.1.5 Word Importance. Lastly, we considered the numerical vecto-
rial representation of the text given by tf-idf. This method, similar
to a bag-of-words approach, highlights content similarity between
different documents. As with the other textual features, we compute
word importance on the text included in the campaign description.
Ultimately, this description is the primary method of communica-
tion between campaign creator and potential donors. While the
success of a campaign is mostly determined by the strength of a
community and their participation in the system, a good story may
persuade chance visitors to donate to the cause.
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4.2 Exploring the Data: Text-Based Features
Figure 2: Word importance in campaign description across
fraudulent and not-fraudulent campaigns. From left to
right, the words are arranged in order of decreasing differ-
ence between the two classes.
Fig 1(a) presents the sentiment analysis for the text of the cam-
paigns. Each bar is the aggregation of emotions for the label indi-
cated. From the figure, we see that as emotions, joy and disgust con-
tain valuable information in the separation of the binary variable.
Interesting is also the balance between the positive and negative
emotions in each campaign. This figure shows that, as emotions in
the text, campaigns that are not-fraud display more joy and less
disgust than campaigns that are fraud. Almost as if the narrator is
making an effort to present their friend or relative (i.e., the benefi-
ciary) as they were; then, present the (presumably negative) reason
for creating the campaign.
One of the most interesting results we found is evidenced in Fig-
ure 2. Word importance for each category shows that while, gener-
ally, both sets of campaigns have similar characteristics, fraudulent
campaigns are perhaps more desperate in their appeal. Starting
from the left side of x-axis, Figure 2 shows that the words money,
help, please, cancer, and get are more prevalent in fraudulent cam-
paigns, whereas not-fraud descriptions will emphasize words like
kidney, transplant, heart, medic(al), and work (right side of x-axis).
In general, legitimate campaigns are more descriptive, being open
about the circumstances in making their appeal.
4.3 Significance: Reducing Dimensionality
Combined, the five types of text-based analysis result in 8,341 fea-
tures extracted from the description provided with the campaign,
but several of them can be sparse (e.g., TFIDF) and others may not
prove to be so helpful in detecting fraud. Therefore, the final step
in our pre-processing of the data is to analyze each feature with re-
spect to the variable we are interested in, and filter out features not
useful. We start by making no assumptions about the distribution of
Figure 3: Object prevalence in images across fraudulent and
not-fraudulent campaigns. From left to right, the objects are
arranged in order of decreasing difference between the two
classes.
our random variables and choose the non-parametric, two-sample
KS test to check whether the difference between the distributions
of the fraud and not-fraud data for each feature are significant at
level a = 0.05. This testing removed features that were not different,
and reduced the space to 71 variables from all five textual analy-
sis categories. Ultimately, in this paper, any result computed with
text-based features includes only the 71 KS significant features5.
5 CAMPAIGN FRAUD: VISUAL CUES
Though the text is the primary means of information, pictures
provide the often essential supporting details of the claim. As with
Section 4, in this section we present the rational for the features
derived from images and the preliminary results of the analysis of
the data collected.
5.1 Feature Extraction
5.1.1 Emotion Representation. Psychological studies show that im-
ages, as a form of visual stimuli, can be used to induce human
emotion [18]. Visual emotion prediction has therefore attracted
much interest from the computer vision community—framed as
a multiclass classification problem using image-emotion pairs as
input-output tuples for learning. Motivated by the foregoing suc-
cesses for visual emotion prediction in transfer learning, we repur-
posed a ResNet-152 [15] a convolutional network pre-trained on
the ImageNet dataset [20] containing 1.2 million images of 1000
diverse object categories. The fine-tuning was performed by replac-
ing the original 1000-way fully connected classification layer with
a newly initialized layer consisting of 8 neurons that correspond to
5We ran a similar analysis using the t-test which assumes that the random variable is
normally distributed and achieved similar performance with the classifier.
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the emotion categories of interest. As defined in [40, 42], the eight
categories were as follows: amusement, anger, awe, contentment,
disgust, excitement, fear, and sadness.
To fine-tune the model, we utilized the Flickr and Instagram (FI)
dataset [40] of 23k images, where each image is labeled as evoking
one of the eight emotions based on a majority vote between five
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. We used 90% of the images for
training and the remainder for validation. During pre-processing,
each image was resized to 256 × 256 × 3 and standardized (per
channel) based on the original ImageNet training data statistics.
We used 100 epochs, to minimize a negative log-likelihood loss,
with stochastic gradient descent, using an initial learning rate of
0.1, momentum 0.9, and a batch size of 128. The learning rate was
multiplied by a factor 0.1 at epochs 30, 60 and 90. We performed
data augmentation by randomly cropping 224 × 224 × 3 image
patches, which is the resolution accepted by ResNet-152. During
fine-tuning, all layers except the classification layer were frozen.
The final model accuracy on the validation data was 73.9%, where
predictions are based on central 224 × 224 × 3 crops.
The semantic evidence over the eight emotions, in the form of
logits (unnormalized log probabilities), can then be extracted for
the crowdfunding images. Each image was resized such that its
shortest side was 256 pixels and then a central crop was extracted
of size 224 × 224 × 3. Semantic emotion category representations
were then extracted from the classification layer.
5.1.2 Appearance and Semantic Representations. Again, with the
help of a pre-trained ResNet-152 model, trained on the ImageNet
dataset, we extracted appearance representations and semantic
representations of each of the images present in the campaigns. For
pre-processing, each crowdfunding image was resized such that its
shortest side was 256 pixels and then a central crop extracted of
size 224×224×3. We standardized each image (per channel) based
on the original ImageNet training data statistics.
The appearance representations is meant to quantize the picture
itself by generating a vector of descriptors from the penultimate
layer of the network. These features ( ∈ R2048) provide a description
of each image where the fields, automatically learnt by the network
can be, e.g., the dominant color, the texture of the edges of a segment,
a (lower level) object — e.g., an eye, among others. In contrast,
the semantic representation expresses the logit presence of pre-
determined objects in each image. The vector (∈ R1000) is extracted
from the classification layer over the 1000 ImageNet classes.
Each representation is useful since convolutional neural net-
works are known to implicitly learn a level of correspondence
between particular objects [41]. Moreover, the representations in-
variably outperform their hand-engineered counter-parts [7].
Finally, we consider the number of faces present in the image
as a possible distinguishing factor between fraud and not-fraud
campaigns. We extract this feature using the dlib [19] HOG-based
face detector and estimate the number of faces present per image.
5.2 Exploring the Data: Image-Based Features
In our analysis of emotion in images we found that, as compared to
the text (in Figure 1(a)), there is a greater imbalance between posi-
tive emotions and sadness. Figure 1(b) shows the positive emotions
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Figure 4: Number of faces detected in images across fraudu-
lent and not-fraudulent campaigns.
as shades of blue and other emotions as indicated in the legend. Sim-
ilar to the text, not-fraud campaigns display more positive emotions
and proportionally less anger and fear through their images.
In our analysis of objects present in each image (Figure 3), we
find that not-fraud campaigns have a stronger presence of objects
that are associated with hospital stays (as evidenced by the presence
of objects like lab coats, pajamas, stretchers, and neck braces) though
the same categories are found to a lesser degree in the fraudulent
campaigns. On the other hand, fraudulent campaigns appear to
include images with objects or concepts that are more casual in
nature, such as barbershop, suit, tie, uniform, which may not fit the
context of CFP campaigns launched for medical-related problems.
Compared to the results in Figure 2, the signal revealed by the
images is not as strong as the one contained in the text, as the sep-
aration is not so clear. The difference between text and images can
be explained by considering that CFPs provide, at times, specific
instructions regarding the types of images to include. For exam-
ple, one such instruction is to include a picture of the fundraising
organizer and the person in need looking happy. Not only does
this homogenize the type of images used in the fundraisers, it also
provides a clear guidebook for potentially fraudulent campaigns,
hence diminishing the predictive power of images, in general, and
the objects identified in those images, in particular.
We also analyze the number of faces detected in the images
of the two types of CFP campaigns, in Figure 4. Even though the
number of faces in the extreme cases (e.g., above 10 faces detected)
follows similar distribution in the two classes, we notice that for
the majority of non-fraudulent campaigns, they tend to include
images with more faces than fraudulent campaigns. Interestingly,
the median for both classes is 1, but the mean for non-fraudulent
campaigns is 1.488 and for fraudulent is 0.8341, which means it
is more common to include images with at least one face in the
non-fraudulent campaigns.
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Table 3: Average precision and accuracy for different classifi-
cation algorithms, for the Label II setup and with text-based
features considered (st. deviation shown in parenthesis).
Classifier Accuracy F1-Score AUC
SVM 0.6223 (0.078) 0.6204 (0.079) 0.6223 (0.076)
k-NN 0.6252 (0.077) 0.6116 (0.083) 0.6252 (0.070)
Naive-Bayes 0.7980 (0.062) 0.7967 (0.063) 0.7980 (0.062)
AdaBoost 0.8061 (0.063) 0.8060 (0.063) 0.8061 (0.063)
Decision Tree 0.8130 (0.062) 0.8129 (0.063) 0.8130 (0.062)
Random Forest 0.8368 (0.059) 0.8367 (0.059) 0.8368 (0.059)
MLP 0.8553 (0.050) 0.8544 (0.050) 0.9252 (0.040)
5.3 Significance: Reducing Dimensionality
Combined, the visual cues amount to 3,057 features. As was the
case with textual features, we expect the semantic representation
of each image to be sparse and some features to be more discrimi-
native than others with regards to our target variable. As was the
case with the text-based features, we used the KS-test to determine
the significance of each descriptor. The result was a vector of 501
features with representatives from all categories: emotion, appear-
ance, semantics, and number of faces. The classification models
contained only these 501 features in all types of image analysis.
6 AUTOMATED DETECTION OF
CROWDFUNDING FRAUD
Next, we present our effort to train a machine learning (ML) clas-
sifier to automatically detect fraudulent campaigns using various
features discussed in the previous sections.
6.1 Experimental Setup
6.1.1 Fraud Scale Grouping. The fraud scale presented in Table 2
can be combined in different ways to generate the overall label of
fraud. In our first experimental setup, we use the union of cam-
paigns with scores {1,2} as fraud, scores {4,5} as not-fraud, omitting
the campaigns with score 3, and denote this setup as Label I. In
the second experimental setup, we define as fraud exclusively the
campaigns with scores of {1}, and not-fraud the campaigns with
scores of {5}, omitting the other campaigns, and denote this setup
as Label II. Practically, in using Label I, we prioritize the need to
get more observations for the training of the classifier, whereas
using Label II, we give more importance to the strength of the signal
being captured, but in reduced instances. In our experiments, we
observed better performance when minimizing the noise in the
signal. Ultimately, we chose Label II for the final results.
6.1.2 ML Classifiers. In choosing a classifier, we need a method
that is fast, robust to noise and not prone to overfit the data, thus,
allowing the model to be generalizable. We tested different classical
ML methods whose implementation is available in sklearn [28]:
Random Forests (RF), AdaBoost, Decision Tree, k-NN, Naive-Bayes
and Support VectorMachine (SVM), and compare their performance
across different metrics. In addition to the classical methods, we
also built a multilayer perceptron (MLP) with one hidden layer
(followed by a ReLU) of dimensionality equal to its input. Each MLP
was trained for 50 epochs using SGD with momentum 0.9, weight
decay 5 × 10−4, a batch size of 1 and initial learning rate of 0.001.
During training, inputs were corrupted on-the-fly with additive
white Gaussian noise ∼ N (0,√0.1).
6.1.3 Performance Metrics. For each classifier, we compute five
metrics: accuracy, precision, recall, F1-score, and the area under
the ROC curve (AUC), which plots the relationship between true
positives and false positives at different operating thresholds of the
classifier. For these metrics, a perfect classifier would score 1 in all.
6.1.4 Experiment Iterations. Initial attempts at classification showed
that the classifiers’ results for different metrics were dispersed. To
obtain accurate measures of each model’s performance, and follow-
ing the law of large numbers, we increased the number of iterations
and looked at the distribution of results for each model. For each
iteration, we perform a random split of train and test data. As ex-
pected, multiple iterations over the different splits of data yielded
different results. Overall, the mean of normally-distributed clas-
sification results can approximate the true value of each metric.
Also, the classes are not balanced and, therefore, we forced the
same number of observations for each class by under-sampling
the bigger class (i.e., a random selection of observations available)
while creating a split per iteration.
We perform two experiments: a preliminary one, to test the
performance of each feature modality (text vs. images), and then
the final one with an ensemble classifier that uses an average of
the two preliminary ones. Results for the classical ML algorithms
were computed by executing 2,000 iterations of the classifiers on
the available text or image data. For the neural network, we used
1,000 models to obtain the final classification.
6.2 Predicting from Different Modalities:
Text vs. Images
Tables 3 and 4 show the performance of the considered classifiers,
using Label II, with textual and visual features, respectively. These
results were obtained by running 2,000 iterations and computing
all metrics for each model. As shown in the tables, all classifiers
outperform the 50% random baseline of binary classification imply-
ing that the signal separating fraud from not-fraud is present in the
data. Interestingly, tree-based models such as Decision Tree and
Random Forest perform fairly well with AUC up to 0.84, just under
the 0.93 AUC exhibited by neural networks on textual features.
We note that textual data alone provide better classification power
than images alone (AUC=0.93 vs 0.67). However, the classification
performance is improved by combining modalities.
6.3 Automatically Detecting Campaign Fraud
The models based on text and images show definite separation
between the class (fraud or not fraud). The next step is to determine
whether combining all features of a campaign into the same model
provides improvement over treating them separately. Tables 3 and 4
show that RF is the best from the classical algorithms, but MLP out-
performs RF in textual features. Thus, we use both RF and MLP to
evaluate the ensemble classifier performance. Furthermore, Table 2
showed that information on each campaign varies: some have no
images while others have multiple. We first run the classification
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Table 4: Average precision and accuracy for different classi-
fication algorithms, for the Label II setup and with visual
features considered (st. deviation shown in parenthesis).
Classifier Accuracy F1-Score AUC
SVM 0.6590 (0.061) 0.6586 (0.061) 0.6622 (0.061)
k-NN 0.6350 (0.061) 0.6319 (0.062) 0.6620 (0.062)
Naive-Bayes 0.6584 (0.062) 0.6576 (0.062) 0.6605 (0.061)
AdaBoost 0.6423 (0.062) 0.6419 (0.062) 0.6609 (0.061)
Decision Tree 0.5701 (0.064) 0.5693 (0.065) 0.6597 (0.060)
Random Forest 0.6746 (0.061) 0.6741 (0.062) 0.6787 (0.061)
MLP 0.6230 (0.056) 0.6167 (0.061) 0.6737 (0.063)
Table 5: Evaluation metrics for the ensemble classifiers us-
ing the Label II setup (st. deviation shown in parenthesis).
Metric RF Ensemble MLP Ensemble
Accuracy 0.8517 (0.068) 0.9014(0.034)
F1-Score 0.8517 (0.068) 0.9013(0.034)
AUC 0.8539 (0.068) 0.9601(0.022)
task separately for text and images, and then combine results into
a single score for each campaign. As before, we train and test RF
with 2K runs, and the MLP on 1K models, on the Label II setup. We
then run an ablation study to determine whether any of the feature
groups (i.e., TFIDF, text Sentiment Analysis, Named-Entity Recog-
nition, the Shape of the word, the Readability Index, the Descriptive
elements of an image, the Objects present in an image, Emotions
triggered by each image, and the number of faces recognized) have
a negative interaction and should therefore be removed.
The results, shown in Table 5 indicate that, while the neural
network approach was comparable to the classical algorithms in
terms of the separate modalities (i.e., images and text), there is a
clear improvement in all metrics when we combine all features in
the same model, with AUC=0.96.
For completeness, Figure 5 presents the distribution of the indi-
vidual evaluations of the neural network for the Label I and Label
II setups. As expected, Label II performs better than Label I. Also,
the models are not dispersed, and the results are consistently over
80% of median performance.
6.4 Clarity: Classifying imperfect data.
In Section 6.1.1, we discussed the impact the labels have on the
classification output. Here, we investigate another configuration
presented as Label III. This corresponds to the scenario where we
train on campaigns with scores of {1} for fraud, and campaigns with
scores of {5} for not-fraud (i.e., Label II setup), and then test this
model on campaigns with label scores {2,4}, corresponding to fraud
and not-fraud, respectively. These campaigns were dropped in Label
II setup, and thus were unseen by the classifier.
In Table 6, we compare the performance of modeling fraud with
Label I, Label II and Label III setups. Overall, we observe that clas-
sifying on a stronger fraud signal (Label II ) translates into better
performance. Also, these results seem to indicate that once a model
Figure 5: Box diagram of the classification results for 1k
models of the neural network (MLP) classifier.
Table 6: Average results for the neural network ensemble
classifier comparing fraud scale labels. The standard devi-
ation is shown in parenthesis.
Scores Accuracy F1-Score AUC
Label I 0.8445(0.358) 0.8438(0.036) 0.9227(0.025)
Label II 0.9014(0.034) 0.9012(0.034) 0.9602(0.022)
Label III 0.9077(0.052) 0.8996(0.067) 0.9358(0.051)
is trained with a sufficiently strong signal, it is able to correctly label
noisy data (AUC = 0.936) on Label III. This shows great promise in
terms of the extensibility and applicability of our work.
7 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
In recent years, crowdfunding has emerged as a means of making
personal appeals for financial support to members of the public.
These may be simple tasks such as a DIY project at home, or more
complex ventures such as starting a new company or medical pro-
cedures. The community trusts that the individual who requests
support, whatever the task, is doing so without malicious intent.
However, time and again, fraudulent cases come to light, ranging
from fake objectives to embezzlement. Fraudsters often fly under
the radar and defraud people of what adds up to tens of millions, un-
der the guise of crowdfunding support, enabled by small individual
donations. Detecting and preventing fraud is thus an adversarial
problem. Inevitably, perpetrators adapt and attempt to bypass what-
ever system is deployed to prevent their malicious schemes.
In this work, we take the first step in studying the problem of
fraudulent crowdfunding campaigns and detecting them at the
time of publication. We collect appropriate data from thousands of
campaigns from different platforms and study fraud cases to better
understand their characteristics. Armed with this knowledge, we
perform an annotation study to label hundreds of campaigns as
fraud or not, with substantial overall annotation agreement. We
proceed to extract characteristics (features) from the text and image
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content included in each campaign, and compare these features
with the associated label of the campaign.
The dataset we built is useful in training machine learning en-
semble classifiers, which can take visual and textual cues from
any crowdfunding campaign, and predict if the campaign is fraud-
ulent or not when created, with satisfactory performance (up to
AUC=0.96). Indeed, there is room for improvement, especially re-
garding feature engineering and classifier complexity and tuning.
However, our results demonstrate that it is possible to detect fraud-
ulent campaigns with high certainty, and allow crowdfunding plat-
forms to remove them semi-automatically, i.e., can be marked for a
more detailed inspection by an administrator.
In practice, we are proposing an automatic method that can
help donors to have an indication of which of the campaigns they
are viewing may be fraudulent. With this method, we attempt to
make the job of fraudsters harder, by proposing a better system
than currently available. In fact, in order to mitigate the risk of
fraudsters catching up with the online model and what features it
monitors for predicting fraud, we can explore different methods
and timings of when to deliver the warning flag to a donor.
In terms of limitations while building this methodology, we
attempted to reduce any bias that may have been introduced by the
annotators. During this process, we created checklists and standards
into what would be defined as fraud, to minimize subjective bias.
A further unbiased way to conduct this study would be to rely
exclusively on convicted cases of fraud, instead of relying onmanual
annotations of suspected cases. However, this option would not
provide enough examples to develop good enoughmachine learning
models, and it would be again up to annotators to identify not-fraud
examples. One solution that would further reduce the risk of bias is
to increase the number of annotators that label each campaign. But
this is highly depended on resource availability. Finally, algorithmic
bias could be reduced. For example, poorly written campaigns by
legitimate requestors who are uneducated or non-native English
speakers can be mislabeled as fraud – a clear source of bias. Also,
there may be limited examples of such campaigns, since these users
may not be willing or comfortable to post a campaign in the first
place. These aspects point to the problem of fair and balanced
representation of characteristics in our training data and labels.
In the future, we plan to improve our classifier to take into
account such sources of bias. We also plan to test our classifier on
unlabeled data of medically-related campaigns to investigate its
capability detecting such fraud cases, which in the health domain
can have a severe monetary and emotional impact on the defrauded.
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